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To cite this article: Eyal Pascovich (2017) Security and Intelligence Studies in Israel, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 19:2, 134-148

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2017.1336402

Published online: 18 Jul 2017.
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ABSTRACT

Academic research on various aspects of national security and intelligence is flourishing in Israel, both by university scholars and at several leading research institutes. The official intelligence establishment has also launched interesting research initiatives in the field. In addition, study options in national security and intelligence have also expanded recently. This article seeks to portray a broad picture of both academic research and teaching in the fields of national security and intelligence in Israel, and to review the various aspects of the cooperation between the Israeli academia and the State’s security and intelligence community.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 6 March 2017
Revised 11 May 2017
Accepted 21 May 2017

KEYWORDS

Intelligence studies; Israel; security studies

Introduction

Academic activity in the fields of national security and intelligence in Western countries has significantly grown during the past two decades. Two prominent examples are the United States, particularly since the 9/11 attacks, as well as the State of Israel, which has been forced to cope with complex challenges in various fields of national security since its establishment in 1948. It is not surprising, therefore, that Israeli political and public discourse focuses heavily on national security issues. Concurrently, academic activity in Israel in these fields has also developed significantly over the years.

The underlying hypothesis of this article assumes that the unique geostrategic reality and the significant security challenges faced by the State of Israel since its establishment will serve as a catalyst for heightened attention in the fields of intelligence and national security at Israeli universities and at academic, governmental, and private research institutions. The article further assumes that mutual and productive work ties have developed between academia and the security and intelligence community in Israel over the years. These will be reflected both in the academic training of members of the community and in ongoing consultation for the intelligence and security services by academic experts.

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This article seeks to offer a broad portrait of academic research and teaching in the fields of national security and intelligence in Israel, and to review the various aspects of the cooperation between Israeli academia and the State’s security and intelligence community.

The article will examine these issues on the basis of diverse open sources: the websites of various research institutes presenting their activities, together with an analysis of the principal outcomes of their studies; the websites of the relevant university departments offering study programs in the field of national security and intelligence; interviews with academics active in the field; the author’s personal experience in academic research in the fields of security and intelligence, and in teaching in the university study programs intended for members of the security community; and a range of secondary sources relating to security and intelligence studies in Israel, in particular, and around the world, in general.

The article begins with a concise review of the development of the field of security and intelligence studies in recent years around the world, with an emphasis on the United States. I will then review the research activity on these subjects in Israel, including separate attention to the various types of research institutes and to researchers in academia. I will also review the principal study programs available in these fields in Israel, both for members of the security community and for “regular” students, and discuss the existing cooperation between academia and the security and intelligence community. Lastly, I will present a number of recommendations for enhancing research and teaching in the fields of intelligence and national security in Israel and for improving the existing cooperation in these fields between academics and practitioners.

Some broader perspectives

The attacks of September 11 in the United States constituted a watershed in terms of the approach of the United States, followed by various Western and other countries, to the phenomenon of terror and to the need to maintain extensive international cooperation in the struggle against terror. In addition to concern among the governmental, security, intelligence, and enforcement agencies responsible for the various aspects of the struggle against terror, interest also grew dramatically among the public and the media. In addition, there has also been a growth of academic and semi-academic attention to the issues of terror and the war on terror in particular, and to additional issues of national security in general, including intelligence aspects.

The flourishing of intelligence studies in the United States in recent years can be credited primarily to the intelligence agencies, which recognize the importance of maintaining an “academic rearguard” to help train their staff
and develop academic methodology in the field. Academic research in the fields of intelligence and national security is divided between academic institutions belonging to the U.S. military (such as the National Intelligence University—http://www.dia.mil/Training/National-Intelligence-University-NIU/) and research bodies within the intelligence agencies (such as the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence]), on the one hand, and on the other private or public educational institutions not accountable to the military or intelligence system.\(^1\) In addition, there are also a large number of think tanks in the United States on issues of government and security.\(^2\) These bodies seek to engage in practical research that will influence decision making by the nation’s leaders.

Lars Nicander, who investigated the role of think tanks in shaping the agenda of the U.S. administration in the areas of foreign relations and security, reached the conclusion that these bodies have a strong impact on policy-making processes in Washington, DC (Nicander, 2015, 2016). He argues that the main reason for this is financial: The financial restraints shared by many governments around the world have led to cuts in government budgets for research and policy making in various fields. Other players, semi-governmental or private, have filled this vacuum, thereby exerting increasing influence over the shaping and consolidation of government policy. This trend has been particularly evident in the United States in recent years but can also be seen in other countries.

However, this development cannot be observed in Israel, where the influence of the civilian sector, including academia and nongovernmental policy research agencies, on decision making on foreign affairs and security is relatively negligible (see, for example, Dror, 1984).\(^3\) The main reason for this is the central role played by the defense system in Israel, and particularly by the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), in all aspects of the shaping of the Israeli agenda on security issues. This situation is in part the product of historical factors, particularly the urgent security problems that have faced Israel since its establishment. Within this context, a particularly prominent feature is the importance of intelligence as a tool enabling decision makers to understand a reality that is becoming increasingly complex due to various regional and global processes, such as the events of the “Arab Spring” and the rise of global Jihad (see Zohar, 2015).

Yet even in the absence of any tangible influence on the Israeli security agenda, academic attention to security and intelligence issues in Israel has risen consistently over the years, and particularly over the past two decades. This activity includes both the various research institutes and researchers at different universities, particularly those that also offer study programs in these fields.
Research activity

Research institutes

Research activity in Israel in different aspects of national security and intelligence is conducted primarily in a number of research institutes and think tanks. The most prominent of these is the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), based in Tel Aviv. According to its website, the INSS “launches and engages in innovative, relevant, high-quality research that shapes the public discourse of issues on Israel’s national security agenda, and provide policy analysis and recommendations to decision makers, public leaders, and the strategic community, both in Israel and abroad” (http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4447). The staff of the INSS, as in the case of other similar institutes, is drawn mainly from former high-ranking officers in the Israeli security services, particularly the IDF.

Other prominent research institutes are the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), which covers the fields of terrorism, counter-terrorism, homeland security, threat vulnerability, risk assessment, intelligence analysis, national security, and defense policy (http://www.ict.org.il/); the National Security Studies Center (NSSC) at the University of Haifa, established in 2000 “to promote research and public discourse on Israel’s national security” (http://nssc.haifa.ac.il/index.php/en/); the Reut Institute, which focuses on socioeconomic developments and national security and global affairs (http://www.reut-institute.org/en/Default.aspx); and the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (http://jcpa.org/), specializing in Israeli national security, regional diplomacy, and international law.4

These institutes have two main outputs: organizing seminars and conferences, some of which also deal with intelligence issues, and publishing periodicals and research papers, especially policy-oriented ones. A particularly reputable periodical is the INSS’s Journal of Military and Strategic Affairs, published three times a year in both Hebrew and English (http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4460). This journal sometimes also publishes articles on intelligence issues. The INSS also launched another academic journal entitled Studies in Intelligence, which as its name implies was devoted to intelligence issues. However, for some reason, the first issue of this journal (October 2007) was also its last.

Although most of these institutes and think tanks prefer to describe their research as an objective one—as expected of any academic activity—it seems that some of them do have an agenda that may be seen as political. An example of this is the reputable Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), which is based in Bar-Ilan University and conducts “policy-relevant research on Middle Eastern and global strategic affairs, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel and regional peace and stability” (https://besacenter.org/about/mission/#.WJL4ehsrLIU). Efraim Inbar, who
directed the BESA Center from 1993 until lately, admitted that his center does have an agenda that is usually seen as Zionist, if not right-wing. However, Inbar insisted that no institution that deals with issues of national security, especially in Israel, can be truly neutral. He suggested that,

In the absence of the option of political neutrality it is intellectual honesty and transparency that must be the guiding force for think tanks. There is hardly any tension between research and policy advocacy if research is conducted in a rigorous way. A think tank must maintain relevancy by being involved either by setting an agenda or by its timely response to emerging issues (“What Do Think Tanks Do?” 2011, p. 37).

Inbar made this candid statement at an international conference held in Jerusalem in 2011 by the Israel Democracy Institute under the title “What Do Think Tanks Do?” Surprisingly, perhaps, most of Inbar’s partners on the conference’s panel “Between Political Neutrality and Commitment/ Affiliation” agreed with him, stating that think tanks wish to change reality, and therefore they must adhere to an ideology that shapes even the topics each institution decides to address.⁵

A good example of a controversial study undertaken by the BESA Center is “The Million Person Gap,” published in 2006 in an attempt to contradict official Palestinian statistics regarding the size of the Arab population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Zimmerman, Seid, & Wise, 2006). The paper’s authors claimed that the Palestinian Authority’s population estimates were inflated due to erroneous demographic assumptions and calculations. According to BESA researchers, the Palestinian Territories’ population in 2004 totaled only 2.49 million, as opposed to 3.83 million according to the Palestinian estimates. These findings led the BESA researchers to assert that “Israeli concerns about demographic pressure from the West Bank and Gaza have evidently been exaggerated. The demographic threat to Israeli society has not quantitatively changed since 1967” (Zimmerman et al., 2006, p. 71). Accepting BESA’s assertion on this point might imply a political conclusion rejecting the call by the Israeli left wing for a withdrawal from the Palestinian Territories due to demographic concerns.

“The Million Person Gap” publication enraged Arnon Soffer, then-head of the Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy at the University of Haifa. Soffer, who has for many years urged Israel to disengage from the Palestinians due to the demographic threat, published a counter-paper entitled “The Million Gap Illusions” (Soffer & Gambash, 2007). The paper constituted a resounding indictment of the BESA Center and its researchers, who were castigated by Soffer as ignorant in statistics and responsible for basic demographic errors, as well as deliberate manipulations in the service of a right-wing political agenda (Soffer & Gambash, 2007).
It is not the goal of this article to adjudicate between the two opposing opinions of Arnon Soffer and the BESA Center. However, this example powerfully demonstrates the political sensitivity of some of the topics covered by Israeli research institutes in the field of national security, especially the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Such studies are almost always influenced by the identity of the researchers and their preconceptions regarding the subjects they seek to examine.

In addition to the abovementioned academic research institutes, it is worth mentioning in this context an official institute, The Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center—IIIC (http://www.iicc.org.il). This institute’s researchers are fortunate to have access to internal materials of the Israeli intelligence community, and especially of AMAN, the military intelligence service. The IIIC operates two research institutes. The first is the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, which publishes papers on such topics as Palestinian, Lebanese, and global terrorism and worldwide anti-Semitism. This center serves as a de facto and undeclared platform enabling AMAN to disseminate its own messages. The second IIIC institute is the Institute for the Study of Intelligence and Policy. This is a much more objective institute than the first and has, to date, published several very interesting books on Israeli intelligence and its history, as well as on the methodology of intelligence.

The IIIC also operates an intelligence library—the only such institution in Israel dedicated to intelligence issues. It also serves as a place of gathering, knowledge sharing, and reminiscence for high-ranking veterans of the Israeli intelligence community and runs various activities intended to preserve the memory and heritage of the community and its fallen members. In addition, the IIIC publishes a non-academic quarterly magazine—MABAT MALAM (http://www.intelligence.org.il/MabatMalam.aspx, in Hebrew only)—consisting of interesting short articles written by veterans of the Israeli intelligence community.

In addition, the Israeli intelligence services also operate their own history and heritage departments. The Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, and the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, are particularly active in this respect. However, the outputs of these departments are classified and intended for internal use only (E. Lapid, personal communication, March 16, 2016).

University scholars

Apart from the formal bodies and research institutes mentioned above, most of the scholars who specialize in Israeli intelligence are affiliated with a number of Israeli universities, mainly in the departments of political sciences. However, their research methodology is mainly historical, in keeping with the British tradition, as opposed to the American tradition of building models for understanding reality and the way it changes. Their publications mainly seek to decipher various chapters from the history of Israeli intelligence, while attempting to overcome
the difficulties that stem from the strict Israeli policy regarding the publication of past security-related records. One of the pioneers of the research in this field is Yoav Gelber, whose seven volumes on the sources of the Israeli intelligence in the pre-State era and during Israel’s early days deserve special mention (Gelber, 1992, 2000).

Naturally, Israeli intelligence scholars focus mainly on intelligence failures rather than successes, since successes usually remain unknown. Not surprisingly, the intelligence failure that preceded the 1973 Yom Kippur War has received special attention. The most prominent scholar who wrote about this episode is Uri Bar-Joseph of the University of Haifa.

Other publications offer a comparison between the Israeli and foreign intelligence communities or focus on international and methodological aspects of intelligence. Israeli scholars also examine the often-complex relations between Israeli security services and the rule of law, as well as raise questions relating to the optimal organizational structure of the Israeli intelligence community. In Israel, unlike other Western countries, the military intelligence service—AMAN—does not confine itself to military issues but covers most intelligence fields, including political intelligence, and serves de facto as the national intelligence assessor. This unique structure invites research and position papers examining the advantages and disadvantages of AMAN’s monopoly over intelligence assessments.

In addition to academic books and articles written by Israeli intelligence scholars, another type of relevant literature should be mentioned here: the memoirs of former directors and other senior officials in the Israeli intelligence community. This unique category of literature can be considered an invaluable treasure for those interested in the history of Israeli intelligence. Written by individuals who had access to the nation’s operational and intelligence secrets, these memoirs enjoy high credibility, although obviously they do not tell the entire story, due to either formal or self-imposed censorship. Indeed, one should not ignore the potential disadvantage of this kind of literature. Memoirs are naturally based on their authors’ memories, which may be inaccurate or biased—either intentionally, with the goal of glamorizing the past, rewriting history, and glorifying the author’s legacy, or unintentionally, given the number of years that have passed since the occurrence of the events. Accordingly, and as with any academic research, it is advisable to crosscheck each fact, interpretation, or argument presented in the pages of such memoirs.

Study programs

Closed study programs for the security establishment

Apart from academic research in the fields of national security and intelligence, several universities in Israel offer academic study programs in national
security, mainly at MA level; these include just a handful courses on intelligence. However, for many years most of the available programs were specifically intended for security force personnel and were not open to the general student population.

The most prominent institutions in this field are Bar-Ilan University, which offers a bachelor’s degree in multi-disciplinary studies for IDF and Shin Bet officers, and especially the University of Haifa, which is considered the academic home of the security services. Every year, around 200 officers from the IDF, the police, Mossad, Shin Bet, and the other security and intelligence services come to the University of Haifa for one day a week, completing a concentrated one-year MA program in national security. This growing trend highlights the great importance attached by the security and intelligence community to the academic training of its officers (G. Ben-Dor, personal communication, April 4, 2016). During their studies, the officers are encouraged to open their minds and are exposed to broad academic, theoretical, and historical perspective on national security. The graduates of this program undoubtedly continue their service as much more mature officers, as was elaborated by Gabriel (Gabi) Ben-Dor, director of national security studies at the University of Haifa:

Through discussion of national security as an academic branch, those involved in practical work in the field gain an overall and integrated perspective of the different factors involved, with the goal of preventing conceptual fossilization or dominance by homogenous approaches. They also receive tools for clarifying critical key issues, and access to a “laboratory” in which they can examine problems liable to preoccupy future decision makers, coordinate analyses and studies of security problems with the goal of encouraging new thinking, and prepare a conceptual stock of this kind for use when necessary (Ben-Dor, 2002, p. 136).

At the same time, it should be noted that some criticism has been leveled at the Israeli academic community for this cooperation with the security establishment. Some critics focus on the alleged immorality of cooperation between universities and the security establishment, while others are concerned at the possible loss of academic freedom, since the security services can force the universities’ hand. These considerations led the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to oppose opening special study programs for the security establishment (Traubmann, 2006a, 2006c).

Another potential criticism of these study programs is that they are open for the security apparatuses only, due to considerations of convenience and other administrative constraints of the universities, as well as the preference of the security establishment itself. However, learning in closed classes with the absence of “regular” students may lead to the undesirable result of fixation of thought and deny the students the benefits of pluralist academic discussions. Moreover, the same administrative constraints (i.e., the need to concentrate the courses in one day a week) may lead to a fixed curriculum
with few, if any, options for elective courses. This format may again be counterproductive to the original goals of these study programs.

Two additional study programs at the University of Haifa deserve special attention. The first of these is called Havatzalot, Hebrew for lily flowers, which form part of AMAN’s symbol. This is an elite three-year BA program that aims to train the next generation of intelligence officers in AMAN. Students in the program spend half of their academic training together, in an integrated department of Middle Eastern studies, international relations, and sociology. However, unlike other study programs for the security services, Havatzalot students enjoy the opportunity to build half their curriculum by themselves, choosing between economics, computer science, mathematics, and philosophy. Thus, they can pursue their own academic interests and engage with “regular” students in mixed classes (Lappin, 2013).

The second program run by the University of Haifa is an MA degree in national security in cooperation with the Israel National Defense College (INDC). The INDC serves as the IDF academy for training high-ranking military officers, as well as senior officials in other security and governmental agencies. This intensive one-year program combines military content, under the responsibility of the IDF, and academic classes at the university. The INDC also maintains a research center that publishes selected academic works written by its students.

The INDC was established in 1962 by virtue of a decision of the Israeli government, stating the goal of the new college as the “consolidation of a comprehensive national defense doctrine and creation of a common language on topics of national security amongst all those who carry the burden of the national security in the state” (Yehezkeli, n.d.). The academization of the INDC study program in cooperation with the University of Haifa began in the mid-1980s (G. Ben-Dor, personal communication, April 4, 2016; E. Lapid, personal communication, March 16, 2016). Over the years, graduating from the INDC and gaining an MA degree in political science from the University of Haifa, with a specialization in national security studies, have de facto become one of the conditions for promotion to the higher ranks in the IDF. In 2006, the gates of the INDC were also opened to students from foreign militaries. Similarly, every year, several IDF senior officers get the opportunity to qualify in national security studies at overseas universities (Pesso, 2013).

**Study programs for civilian students**

Until recently, study opportunities in the field of national security for “regular” students who do not belong to the security services were very limited. The oldest program is probably the Security Studies Program of the Political Science Department at Tel Aviv University, established in 1991 as an interdisciplinary MA degree.
about). Another program—the only undergraduate program in Israel in the field of security studies—is run by the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC) and offers a BA in government with a specialization in homeland security and counter-terrorism (http://www.idc.ac.il/he/schools/government/undergraduate/Pages/counterterror.aspx).

A significant development in this field was the opening in late 2015 of a specific MA program in intelligence studies at Bar-Ilan University, the first program of its kind in Israel.\(^{20}\) In addition, the availability of individual courses on intelligence has also expanded recently in several universities.

Moreover, in recent years, new international MA programs in security studies have been launched at several Israeli universities and colleges, such as the National Security Studies Program at the University of Haifa (http://securitystudies.haifa.ac.il/), the International MA Program in Security and Diplomacy at Tel Aviv University (https://secdip.tau.ac.il), and the MA International Program in Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security at the IDC Herzliya (http://www.idc.ac.il/en/schools/rris/graduate/Pages/counter-homeland.aspx). The students in these programs are usually a mixture of both foreign and Israeli students, and the courses are taught in English.

**Cooperation between academia and the security apparatus**

This review would not be complete without at least a brief reference to the cooperation between the Israeli academia and the security and intelligence community. Obviously, the cooperation between the two should not be limited to academic training. The relationship should also include ongoing and comprehensive consultation by the security and intelligence community with academic experts, who have the time and knowledge to conduct in-depth studies. Unfortunately, this aspect would still appear to be deficient in Israel and confined mainly to personal acquaintances, for example with former high-ranking officers who have since entered academia, rather than a structured practice implemented by the security and intelligence services. This situation is due, among other reasons, to a “we know better” attitude among some elements of the security establishment, who show a haughty and patronizing approach toward the academic world.\(^{21}\) Conversely, some academics show a tendency to remain in their ivory tower rather than attempting to bridge theory and practice.\(^{22}\)

However, in at least two prominent cases, academia exerted enormous influence over political and national security developments. The first is the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, which was born in 1993 following a confidential academic discourse initiated by Yair Hirschfeld from the University of Haifa and his colleague historian Ron Pundak with senior officials in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).\(^{23}\)
Two other academics from the University of Haifa may have influenced another historical event: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s Disengagement Plan from Gaza, which was implemented in 2005. Sharon’s plan may have been inspired by the ideas of Dan Schueftan, head of the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa, and his colleague, the above-mentioned Arnon Soffer, both of whom have urged Israel for many years—in speech and in writing—to disengage from the Palestinians (G. Ben-Dor, personal communication, April 4, 2016).

**Conclusion and recommendations**

This article has summarized current developments in academic research and teaching in the various fields of security and intelligence studies in Israel. The review clearly shows that research on various aspects of national security is flourishing in Israel, including at several leading research institutes. In addition, a number of scholars at Israeli universities specialize in the field of intelligence, producing a fine collection of books and articles. Other publications, especially on the history of the Israeli intelligence, are a result of research initiatives launched by the official intelligence establishment.

Study options in the field of national security have also expanded recently, including the opening of a specific academic program in intelligence studies. In addition, the phenomenon of closed classes for security and intelligence officers has become relatively widespread at several Israeli universities, proving that Israel’s security and intelligence services attach great importance to the academic training of their officers.

Despite the growth of security and intelligence studies in Israel, a number of aspects of both research and teaching in this field still require improvement. Firstly, retired security and government personnel should certainly be encouraged to join the academic world in order to share their practical experience with theoreticians. At the same time, research institutes must not rely solely on such former officials, but should serve as a hub for brainstorming and knowledge exchange between practitioners and academics.

Secondly, with the exception of a few series of publications in Hebrew issued by some of the research institutes, most academic articles by Israeli scholars on issues of national security and intelligence are written in English and published in foreign journals. This presumably reflects a desire on the part of the scholars to present their writings to the international academic community, but it also highlights the dearth of Hebrew-language journals in this field. Accordingly, we strongly recommend the establishment of high-quality new Hebrew-language journals devoted to national security issues, including the revival of the welcome past initiative to publish a Hebrew journal dedicated to intelligence.

With regard to teaching opportunities in these fields, it is recommended that the programs currently available exclusively to security apparatuses
personnel be opened up to “regular” students, despite the administrative difficulties involved. This will promote fruitful class discussions and encourage the security personal to think outside the “security box.” The existing trend of international study programs—with the participation of Israeli students—is also very important, encouraging the expansion of the academic scope, both historically and geographically, rather than focusing solely on Israel’s current national security challenges.

Finally, the cooperation between Israeli academia and the security and intelligence establishment should be strengthened and extended to all areas of research and activity, for the mutual benefit of both practitioners and academics. However, such cooperation demands an effort from both sides. Academics in the various fields of national security and intelligence should seek to engage in applied research that can be translated into clear conclusions and practical recommendations. On the other side, the attitude of “we know better” among some elements of the security establishment should be replaced by a more modest approach. Bringing together these sometimes two opposing worlds is extremely important: as this article has clearly shown, Israeli academia has much to contribute on issues of national security and intelligence.

Notes

1. On the upsurge in the field of intelligence studies in the U.S. during the past few years, see Campbell (2011).
2. Such as the Rand Corporation, which operates a unique center for research into intelligence policy: http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/dents/intel.html.
3. The Egyptian researcher Heba Gamal El Din (2016) reached a different conclusion. However, his study addressed the impact of think tanks on the formulation of public policy in general in Israel, whereas we are concerned here with the limited sector of bodies involved in security and intelligence issues.
4. In addition to these institutes focusing on aspects of national security, several other institutes conduct research on Middle Eastern issues. The most prominent of these is the Moshe Dayan Center (MDC) for Middle Eastern and African Studies, based at Tel Aviv University: http://dayan.org/.
5. For a video clip of the conference panel, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eNhYahRqmYs.
7. See, for example, Brun (2015) and Gilboa and Lapid (2012). For a review of the latter publication, see Pascovich (2016).
8. Another interesting formal non-academic publication that deserves mention is the IDF’s bi-monthly magazine Ma’arachot, which publishes interesting articles on security, military, and intelligence matters: http://maarachot.idf.il/71929-he/Maarachot.aspx.
9. See, for example, Kahana (2006), Sheffy (2008), and Pascovich (2015b).
10. It should be mentioned in this context that the Israel Archives Law imposes a confidentiality period of no less than 70 years on most of the files that belong to the security and intelligence agencies.
11. Gelber’s final three volumes of this project were dedicated to the Israeli intelligence community during the State’s early days and were published solely in a classified edition inside the IDF.

12. See, for example, Bar-Joseph (2005) and Bar-Joseph (2016).

13. See, for example, Bar-Joseph (1995).

14. See, for example, Kam (1988) and Pascovich (2012).

15. See, for example, Shpiro (2006) and Pascovich (2015a).

16. See, for example, Pascovich (2014).

17. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this type of literature, see Pascovich (in press).

18. The curriculum includes such courses as Chapters in Terrorism, Terrorism and Crime, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Israel’s National Security Policy, and Israel’s Foreign Policy, as well as at least one course on intelligence entitled National Intelligence Theory and Israel’s Intelligence Community.

19. Thus, for example, Moshe Zimmerman, a distinguished historian from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, commented that students from a special program for the IDF missed one of his classes because they were serving at roadblocks, adding that he “would prefer that if someone misses class, it is because he is sitting in jail because he did not want to sit at a roadblock;” see Traubmann (2006b).

20. The explanatory remarks on the occasion of the opening of this new program noted that “the expanding information revolution, the ongoing change in the nature of war, and the current upheavals in the Middle East require us to reexamine the way we research, understand and deal with national security, military and Intelligence.” See http://politics.biu.ac.il/node/869.

21. Thus, for example, Boaz Ganor, who heads both the School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy and the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at IDC Herzliya, complains that Shin Bet, the Israeli security agency responsible for the war on terror, is unwilling to cooperate with the ICT and to take advantage of its experts’ knowledge and experience (B. Ganor, personal communication, March 13, 2016).

22. The problems and inhibitions that characterize the relationship between the intelligence community and academia (and, more broadly, those between security bodies and the civilian sector) are not unique to Israel. In this context, see the interesting article by Filip and Ştefureac (2011) examining the case of Romania.

23. For the account of Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak on the secret negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords, see Hirschfeld (2014) and Pundak (2013).

24. See, for example, Schueftan (1999) and Soffer (2003). Soffer warned (p. 74) that “if the separation of Jews and Arabs throughout the land is not executed and quickly, it is clear that a decided Arab majority will dwarf the Jewish landscape—the physical and human landscapes alike—in Israel. The demographic clock is ticking away against Israel, threatening it in a time span of just ten years.”

Notes on contributor

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